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This paper examines the reasons for the early dominance of the bureaucratic élite in 
Pakistan and the downsizing that was brought about by the administrative reforms of 1973. The 
perceptions of bureaucrats and ministers indicate that loyalty to political establishment is now 
regarded a crucial requirement in a bureaucrat. This shift from the principle of political neutrality 
to the practice of political allegiance has affected both the development agenda as well as the 
institutions of the country. 
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the first thing I want to tell you is that you should not be influenced by any political 
pressure, by any political party or individual politician……governments are 
defeated, prime ministers come and go, ministers come and go, but you stay on, and 
therefore there is great responsibility placed on your shoulders. You should have no 
1
hand in supporting this political leader or that; this is not your business….
The Pakistani state has been regarded as ‘a weak state’ for the last three decades on 
account of the inability of the elected government to successfully broker political stability. 
The development literature locates this weakness in the political and ministerial 
machinations rather than attributing it to any inherent characteristics of the bureaucracy as an 
organisational structure. In the 1990s, the literature emerging from international institutions 
and academia located Pakistan’s failure to develop in the malfunctioning apparent in the 
Pakistani bureaucracy. This shortcoming was linked to the increasing politicisation of the 
bureaucracy and its growing and explicit links to the ministerial structures [World Bank 
(1998)]. In particular, there was a focus on the inability of individual bureaucrats to follow 
the organisational rules due to a set of perverse incentives that were misaligned with the 
development objectives of the bureaucracy. Such an organisational shortcoming came to be 
regarding as a lack of capacity with regard to governance functioning within the bureaucracy 
[Khan (2000, 2001)]. In more recent years, the inability of the Pakistani state to ensure 
development and to maintain the peace has marked it out as a fragile or failed state [Kaplan 
(2008)]. There is now a growing concern that the inability of the Pakistani state has been due 
to an excessive politicisation of the Pakistani state.
This article examines the role of the bureaucracy in Pakistan by drawing on 
qualitative data on the perceptions of bureaucrats in Pakistan. The intention of the article is to 
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Durham: 
evaluate whether the implications drawn regarding the bureaucratic behaviour, in particular 
the need to have a politically neutral bureaucracy, have any traction with the subjective 
perceptions of the bureaucracy. 
Methodology
The aim of the research was to investigate the dynamics underpinning the Pakistani 
bureaucracy; to examine their views on the institution that they were a part of, their 
perceptions of themselves, their colleagues, their bosses, and the institution they 
represented. The primary focus was the subjective experience of the individuals 
2
interviewed.
This article is based on primary research undertaken in Pakistan during October 2007 
to June 2008. A total of 33 qualitative interviews were conducted, 29 were senior bureaucrats 
and 4 of ministers. The Subjects are selected because of who they were and what they knew, 
rather than by chance. The interviews were mostly of retired bureaucrats, and some serving 
senior officers.  There was a larger focus on the retired bureaucrats because they had more 
years in service, hence could offer richer insights. Also they could be more candid as they had 
little to lose in terms of career prospects. But to ensure triangulation some serving 
bureaucrats and ministers were interviewed.  
Every individual bureaucrat being interviewed was a primary unit of analysis and an 
individual case study. The field research was limited to Lahore and Islamabad. Since the 
senior most bureaucrats are posted to the federal capital Islamabad and they usually retire 
there at grade 22 as federal secretaries, hence it was the best place to obtain interviews from 
them.
1.  THE STATE OF PAKISTAN
Since September 9/11, the Pakistani state has been increasingly designated as a failed 
state [Kaplan (2008)]. This is a disclaimer against the ability of the Pakistani state for it 
indicts all arms of the state, including the bureaucracy in its inability to deliver development, 
even in relation to its most basic attributes of internal law and order. 
This notion of the failed state differs from that of the fragile state, one that has a lack 
of capacity and/or will to first foster an environment conducive to sustainable development, 
and suffers from failures of legitimacy, service delivery and accountability [Stewart and 
Brown (2009)]. The malfunctioning bureaucracy is, regarding in this literature, as an 
example of a dysfunctional arm of the state which could contribute and/or further exacerbate 
the failure of development. The weak state in contrast is a consequence of a state formation 
where non-state players might be dominant and which demand that the state make a political 
settlement to ensure state legitimacy and therefore must need relegate development to a 
lesser objective [Khan (1996)]. These three notions of state incapacity have been used rather 
indiscriminately in recent years resulting in a reduced understanding of how the various arms 
of the state do or do not deliver development objectives. 
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The paper examines the bureaucrats’ own perception of their profession and the manner and extent to 
which they have been able to maintain their political neutrality. The bureaucrats have identified political 
interference as a major consideration. While other factors such as a fall in the real income of the bureaucrat or the 
change in the service conditions of the bureaucrat might also play a role these were not identified as major factors by 
the interviewees. As the research methodology was to analyse the perceptions rather than a comprehensive set of 
objective conditions that face the bureaucracy factors not raised by the bureaucrats have been further investigated.
Additionally, the importance of an impersonal and non politicised bureaucracy as a 
prerequisite for a functioning state is swept away in a hasty sweep in the policy sphere that 
regards the presence of ministerial and bureaucratic corruption as an indication of state 
failure. This flies in the face of the reality on the ground that countries that have a similar 
level of corruption have very different growth rates [Przeworski (1996)]. Also there are 
countries which have had considerable growth despite close links between the bureaucracy 
and the contractual process [c.f. Malaysia, see Khan and Jomo (2000)]. Finally, there is little 
clarity of the causality of these two phenomenon: the benefit of untangling the impact of 
failed states as a consequence of ministerial and bureaucratic corruption [Khan (2001)] from 
the obverse strand that regards the increasing politicisation of the bureaucracy as an incipient 
cause of state failure [Shafqat (1999)] needs to be undertaken to understand what is 
happening in the Pakistani bureaucracy. 
Political Neutrality and the Consequences for Development 
Political neutrality for the purpose of this paper primarily implies that the 
bureaucracy is above and beyond politics. It is neutral and impartial. It is not aligned with, 
has a preference for, or biased against any political party. Loyalty is to the public and not to 
3
one political personality or party. The primary objective of the bureaucrat  is to provide 
public service without political alignment, bias, preference, or interference. Political 
neutrality also implies that there is no political interference in appointments of public 
servants. And appointments are made purely on the basis of merit and competence. Political 
neutrality if it holds, gives the public servant a sense of security. The bureaucrat will be 
assigned to a post based on his merit, and it would be his skill of execution that would be 
sufficient to take him to the next hierarchal level. All bureaucrats would work based on 
principles of hard work and independent and impersonal thinking, and there would be no 
benefit to be gained from currying favours with the political masters. Hence for the 
bureaucracy to be productive there is the need to make it independent from political 
intervention and pressures that would enable the civil servant to perform public service in an 
efficient and professional manner.
Politicisation of the bureaucracy on the other hand is one of the key causes of the 
decline in the civil service systems. The lack of job security due to politically motivated 
decisions on recruitment, promotion and dismissal and the lack of career perspective for the 
staff due to the ever increasing number of posts subject to political appointments all 
contribute to declining efficiency of the bureaucrats. The incentive to work hard, to be fair, to 
be efficient erodes in such contexts. The link between performance and reward is broken and 
individual merit is relinquished by political interventions and the efficiency and productivity 
of the organisation are compromised. In senior, significant positions like secretary of 
education, economic affairs, commerce, and finance etc, the qualities of ability and 
competence should be the criteria for the appointment, as the appointee and its skills are for 
the execution of tasks essential for national development. In a situation where these positions 
are awarded to political loyalists and not to  those who are the best equipped for the job, 
economic development is held hostage. When a bureaucrat is not politically neutral and is 
politically aligned to serve the interests of a co-opted individual, who is pursuing personal 
benefit, at the cost of national interest, then service delivery suffers. Political alignment 
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As the Ideal Bureaucrat envisaged by Weber (1968).
results in serving merely the interests of politicians and their constituency, ensuring the 
politicians’ vote bank, working for selected interests and not for the common man. So lack of 
political neutrality would imply that the public servants are serving selected individuals 
interests and not the common man. Economic development of the country is not the priority 
but the interest of particular individuals and their parties takes precedence. And the 
bureaucracy is no longer following and respecting the guiding principles of its profession.
Max Weber and the Ideal Bureaucrat
The established and now traditional literature on the bureaucracy is largely derived 
from the work on the 19th century social scientist Max Weber. The Weberian bureaucrat was 
expected to conform to norms of rationality, specialisation, political neutrality, meritocratic 
recruitment and long term career ladders among other characteristics [Weber (1968)]. The 
notion of political neutrality set out in the Weberian framework requires that the bureaucracy 
to be indifferent to the political party in power and to ensure that their actions are based on 
neutrality and impartiality with regard to all political parties. The bureaucrat is regarded as a 
public servant who operates solely in the interest of the public and should not bow to pressure 
from the political process or parties. The Weberian construction of the ideal bureaucrat as a 
rational, efficient, and achievement-oriented provides the template for evaluating the actions 
and effectiveness of the bureaucrat.  The Weberian bureaucrat is regarded as an agent of the 
state; an agent who is characterised as functioning not on an inherent sense of motivation but 
on an externally imposed set of criteria. The implication is that the actions of the bureaucrat 
should not be driven by any intrinsic values but are instrumental in nature. The duties of the 
bureaucrat in the civil service are restricted to policy implementation as part of the executive 
4
arm of the state.  The instrumentality of bureaucratic behaviour is a consequence of the 
autonomy gained from externally imposed rules. It is the very principles of meritocratic 
recruitment that ensures that bureaucrats embark on well defined, non-politicised and 
predictable long term career paths. These rules provided the basis for a Weberian 
bureaucracy that was achievement and goal oriented, protected from political interference, 
and following norms of rationality, discipline, specialist knowledge. These objective 
standards and impersonal rules that provided the framework for running the bureaucracy in 
turn ensured stability and predictability in the organisation. The bureaucratic organisation 
was consequently the most stable, predictable and ‘Once fully established, bureaucracy is 
among those social structures which are the hardest to destroy’ [Weber (1968), p. 87].
The notion of political neutrality is based on the theory and historical experience of 
Western European states which have undergone a separation of church, state and society, 
5
through the course of the 18th and 19th centuries.  This notion of political neutrality has been 
taken as a characteristic with which to evaluate the ability and performance of the 
bureaucracy in developing countries. The bureaucrat is regarded as successful in the 
Weberian sense, if public service is provided without any favours being granted to the 
political establishment and without interference from any political quarters. [Cheema and 
Sayeed (2006)]. The reality in many developing countries where political interference and 
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Tanwir and Fennell
alignment are the norm rather than the expectation in the government so that it is 
commonplace for bureaucrats to be transferred by ministers [Wade (1985)] gives rise to a 
political economy where the bureaucrat seeks to maximise his private income while in a 
particular office rather than to place the top priority on the delivery of development 
objectives.
Early studies of the bureaucracy in Pakistan indicate that the power of the 
bureaucracy emanating from a full set of objective rules and standards was present at 
6
independence but began to dwindle shortly thereafter.  To understand the reason for the 
existence of a full set of rules at independence has much to do with the tracing the historical 
origins of Pakistani bureaucracy and political neutrality under the British colonial rule. The 
British system of administration was developed to suit the needs of a colonial power. The 
British imperial civil service regarded this bureaucratic machinery as the appropriate 
instrument to rule colonies effectively, to establish their hegemonic rule, to effectively 
collect revenue.
The basic objectives of the British Indian system of public administration, which 
incorporated some important features of the Mughal administrative system, and 
which remained unchanged until the partitioning of India and creation of Pakistan in 
1947, lay in the maintenance of law and order, revenue collection, dispensation of 
7
justice and the provision of basic services.
Pakistan incorporated this system of bureaucratic rule without much modification at 
independence in 1947. In the face of a new political establishment, incorporation of the 
inherited civil service structure remains questionable. As the newly independent state, the 
Pakistani government faced a different mandate that of promoting economic and social 
development, and what was an effective institution used to govern colonies might no longer 
be appropriate or adequate to ensure that the development objectives were met.
The Pakistani administrative system inherited clearly delineated legacy, based on a 
constitutional structure with well defined rules and regulations.  The role of the bureaucrat 
within this set up was restricted to that of the policy implementer. The context of Pakistan’s 
history with a set of political parties that largely develop after partition and independence 
results in relative fragility in the political system in contrast to the administration institution 
8
[Alavi (1972)].
9
There have been numerous studies  that have examined the extent of political 
neutrality prevalent within the functioning of the Pakistani bureaucracy in the earlier 
decades of the inception of Pakistan. In the current development discourse there is increasing 
importance awarded to the significance of transparency, accountability and political 
neutrality of the bureaucracy to ensure good governance. A recent evaluation by the 
Brookings Institution uses the ‘the lack of accountable political institutions’ and the lack of 
'the ability of the state bureaucracy to function effectively, independently, and responsibly, 
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has been used as one of the criteria to assess the level of weakness and fragility of a state.   In 
such a context where there is little evidence of feedback mechanisms and punitive sanctions 
for misdemeanor by a bureaucrat the Weberian model is unlikely to provide an automatic 
remedy [Wade (1985)]. In its stead, there is a strong rationale for the existence of a state 
model based on political settlement where all stakeholders within the state apparatus are 
made side payments to ensure the stability of the existing weak state [Khan (1996)]. 
The proposition that the Pakistani bureaucracy is a Weberian institution has become a 
subject of considerable interest. One yard stick against which to evaluate the Pakistani 
bureaucracy has been to ascertain whether Weberian characteristics of meritocratic 
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recruitment and long-term career ladders are in evidence.  Another consideration has been 
12
with regard to adherence to the system of rules in the Pakistani bureaucracy.  What is less 
clear is whether political neutrality, a quintessentially Weberian characteristic, should 
13
continue to be used as a characteristic to classify a bureaucracy as Weberian.  While the 
constitutional position is clearly important, the focus of the article is on the relationship 
14
between the bureaucrat and the minister.  The environment in Pakistan, within which 
bureaucrats operate, cannot be based on an idealised notion of political neutrality; In fact, 
such a proposition becomes a hollow objective and a meaningless recommendation within 
the context of the incentives that are faced by these individuals. Where bureaucratic 
performance is rewarded in relation to the bureaucrat’s ability to please his or her political 
masters, promotion on the grounds on competence and expertise are few and far between. In 
fact a bureaucrat who chooses to follow principle of Political Neutrality is far more likely to 
be removed on the basis of political grounds. 
The following section examines the extent of political neutrality exercised by the 
bureaucracy in its earlier decades of Pakistan political and administrative history. 
2. THE POLITICAL INHERITANCE IN PAKISTAN 1947-1972
The kingpin position went to the district magistrate under the British administration 
and the prominence accorded to the bureaucracy continued in full glory after the gaining of 
independence in 1947. Rowland Egger (1953) reviewing the bureaucratic system in Pakistan 
15
concluded that the bureaucracy had hardly changed the days of the British Raj.  An 
important reason for bureaucratic potency in the initial years was their ability to consolidate 
their importance in the inherited colonial system. The early advantage gained by the 
bureaucracy was difficult to dent and this led to an imbalance between bureaucratic power 
and political directives, with the former being far more dominant than the latter [Alavi 
(1990)]. It has even been argued that the bureaucracy actually grew in relative importance 
within the government after 1947 as the civil service used the well established set of rules 
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and standards to control and direct the behaviour of the entire administration, including the 
directives of the politicians [Sayeed (1967), p.76].
The increasing importance of the bureaucracy in the Pakistani administration was 
evident in the early laws and acts brought in by the Pakistani government. Sayeed (1967) 
cites the example of the Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act, (PRODA) 
1949, which gave the central government the right to dismiss defiant or corrupt provincial 
politicians under Section 92 A of the Act. This act went a long way in strengthening the hold 
of the bureaucracy, Saeed (1967) recounts that this act gave the impetus to the bureaucracy 
which resulted in the premier of Sindh being dismissed on charges of corruption and 
misconduct in April 1948, and the west Punjab ministry was dismissed in January 1949 and 
several other dismissals and ministerial changes were experienced in the province of Sindh 
16
during 1948-51.
Kennedy (1987) in his seminal work on the Pakistani bureaucracy informs that the 
bureaucracy managed most key portfolios in the early formative years. In 1953 the national 
government, under Nazimuddin, was itself was dismissed by Ghulam Mohammad, a civil 
servant who had begun his career in the British Indian audit and accounts service. 
Additionally, the key posts in this government administration were held by civil servants: 
General Iskander Mirza was a civil servant given charge of the Ministry of Interior and of 
states and frontier regions; Chaudry Mohammad Ali, a civil servant was appointed Minister 
for Finance and Economic Affairs; and General Ayub was given the portfolio of the Ministry 
of Defense. 
The deliberate sidelining of the politicians within the political administration and the 
manifest preference for bureaucrats and generals as appointees to key ministerial posts was 
commented among by the international broadsheets.  
With so many illiterate people, politicians could make a mess of things…..there was 
no point in having the fine administrative system with good traditions that Pakistan 
has inherited unless it was run in the British way. A district officer or magistrate must 
be given full powers to deal with any situation. Politicians could make policy, but 
17
they must not interfere….
The major rationale given for the preferment of the bureaucracy over the politicians 
by Sayeed (1967) was that there was an urgent need to deliver effective programmes; 
particularly in relation to the rehabilitation of migrants coming over from India, in the 
aftermath of the Partition and also to embark on a national development plan. In these early 
decades the officers of Audit and Accounts, Railways and Indian Political Service dominated 
the national economic and political decision-making processes while the political leaders 
found it difficult to develop any consensus on a framework for developing a political system. 
During the early decades while there was no evidence of a radical shift from the imperial 
system there was slowing down of the execution of bureaucratic operations such as the 
practice of writing longer and longer marginal notes on files, congestion at the top, over 
centralisation, over coordination and excessive cross referencing that was bringing the 
18
bureaucratic machine to a grinding halt [Sayeed (1967)].  Also the imbalance in the 
administration between civil servants and politicians where political elites were unable to 
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control key governmental roles had a highly detrimental effect on the growth and maturity of 
the political party system. The intra-state jousting within Pakistan resulted in the repeated 
victory of military or bureucratic elites. The failure of the politician in knocking down these 
elites resulted in a very under-developed political party system and also rendered the 
Pakistan Muslim league incapable of consolidating its role in the country [Heeger (1973)].  
There was a strong social distinction between the civil servant and the politician, where the 
former was regarded as urban, skilled and astute, while the latter appears as a rural farmer, 
untutored and undiscerning and therefore not suited for high office. The seeming ineptitude 
of the politician provided the rationale for the wresting of control by the bureaucracy over the 
first quarter century of Pakistan’s independent existence. Laporte (1974) informs that it was 
the overarching structure of the civil service that facilitated Pakistan’s growth in the 
economic sphere and continued to undermine political development in the country. 
The mismatch in the authority of the bureaucrat and the politician is at the heart of the 
political dismantling that occurred in Pakistan between the 1950s and 1970. The disdain and 
disregard of the views and demands of the political classes was also reflected in the 
Constituent Assembly debates in 1956 where provincial ministers complained that officials 
refused to carry out their orders because they believed that they (the ministers) had no power 
to take action against recalcitrant officers who defied their order. In this environment it was 
commonplace to ignore or bypass political appointees when making administrative 
decision. The incompetence and ineptitude of the political classes even came to be cited as 
reasons for at the time of the coup d'état in 1958 by President Iskander Mirza and General 
19
Ayub Khan [Alavi (1990)].
The political vacuum, political instability, and lack of experienced and resourceful 
politicians all paved the way for the bureaucrat to redefine his role taking over the major 
decision making including formulation and implementation of policy. The views of key 
authors and their reasons for this decided imbalance between the bureaucracy and the 
political classes are summarised in Table 1. 
The decided by skewed between the various arms of the state received little remedy 
and reform in the civil service and remained limited till the 1970s. The relationship between 
the bureaucracy and the political parties altered in the 1970’s. From holding the bastion of 
power, being the prime decision makers, having the strength to be politically neutral and 
having the constitutional guarantee on their side, the tide changed against the bureaucracy. 
The introduction of bureaucratic reforms were brought on by changes in the national 
institutional forces due to the considerable student disturbances of 1968-69, dismemberment 
of the country, and rise of the Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) [Shafqat (1999); Kennedy 
(1987)]. On the 2nd of December 1969 the resentment culminated in the form of Martial Law 
Ordinance No. 58 by President Yahya Khan. As a consequence of this Order, 303 Class-I 
Officers were removed from service. This measure of Yahya Khan was widely acclaimed by 
the media and opinion-makers of the country and he was portrayed as ‘a leader who was 
20
trying to eliminate the corrupt officers of the Civil Services’ [Shafqat (1999)].
Secondly, the 1971 conflict between India and Pakistan led to the separation of East 
Pakistan further weakening the position of the bureaucracy in Pakistan. The CSP was further 
weakened as a cadre because 89 Bengali CSP officers holding posts above Deputy Secretary 
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Table 1
Summary of Research on Bureaucratic Dominance
Author Name of the Book/Paper Emphasis on
Hamza Alavi Authoritarianism and 
Legitimation of State Power 
in Pakistan.
The state power in Pakistan since 
independence has been concentrated in 
the hands of a military bureaucratic 
oligarchy.
Khalid B. Sayeed The Political Role of 
Pakistan’s Civil Service.
Since independence the civil servants 
played an even more powerful role than 
their imperial predecessors primarily due 
to weak political parties, and military 
dominance.
Saeed Shafqat The Pakistani Bureaucracy. 
Crisis of Governance and 
Prospects of Reform.
Ayub cut down the dominance of the 
CSP, which was further cut to size by 
Bhutto. The 1973 reforms adversely 
affected the bureaucracy.
Lawrence Ziring The Pakistan Bureaucracy; 
Two Views.
The bureaucracy after independence was 
strong and domineering. Bhutto’s 
reforms altered the situation, which could 
have been averted it the bureaucracy had 
been a little compromising. 
Robert  Laporte The Pakistan Bureaucracy; 
Two Views.
 
The Pakistani bureaucracy retained the 
colonial character. Filled the power 
vacuum after independence. Bhutto took 
away the power of the bureaucracy.
Khalid B. Sayeed The Political System of 
Pakistan, 1967.
 
The bureaucracy after independence 
filled the power vacuum which the 
politicians were unable to fill. He 
describes in detail the hierarchal set up of 
the CSP.
Charles Kennedy The Bureaucracy in 
Pakistan. 1987, Oxford 
University Press.
Describes Pakistan as a bureaucratic 
polity. Describes its dominant rule in 
Pakistan. Describes the politicisation of 
the bureaucracy since the 1973 reforms.
Ralph Briabanti Research on the 
Bureaucracy of Pakistan.
It contains a record of documents 
pertaining to the administration of 
Pakistan. And discusses various facets of 
the administration. it contains critical 
information and can be used as a 
reference book.
Gerelad Heeger Bureaucracies, Political 
Parties and Political 
Development.
He argues that Bureaucratic dominance 
in Pakistan resulted not due to 
organisational superiority but because of 
monopolisation of key governmental 
offices in the political system by 
bureaucratic elites.
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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level (28 of whom were Joint Secretary or above), after the dismemberment of Pakistan 
opted for Bangladesh considerably downsizing the bureaucratic institution and thereby 
reducing the influence of the CSP as a cadre [Kennedy (1987)]. The rise of the PPP and its 
leader Mr Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto during these years also turned the tide against the Pakistani 
bureaucracy. There was a huge swing in public perception and the CSP officer began to be 
perceived as a hindrance to the development of the country. Laporte (1974) informs that 
there was a growing desire among the middle class (including non central service 
bureaucrats) for increased status and participation which provided a manpower alternative to 
the regime. Bhutto formed an administrative reform committee in 1972 which was to review 
and formulate recommendations to change the prevailing bureaucratic system. The prime 
consideration was to ensure a shift from an administered state to one that was driven by the 
political processes [Ziring and Laporte (1974)].
 In an address to the nation on August 20, 1973 on the state of his economic reform, 
Bhutto expressed his opinion of the bureaucracy:
It is often averred that the bureaucratic apparatus is a neutral instrument which can be 
bent to any kind of policy. But this neutrality is mythical. The bureaucracy itself is a 
powerful vested interest, concerned more with its own good than with the good of the 
public. No institution in the country has so lowered the quality of our national life as 
to what is called Naukarshahi. It has done so by imposing a caste system on our 
society. It has created a class of Brahmins or mandarins, unrivalled in its snobbery 
and arrogance, insulated from life of the people and incapable of identifying itself 
with them.
 [Jones (1997)]
The avowed political neutrality that was to characterise the Pakistani bureaucracy 
was thereby swept away and replaced by a less rational, politically mired, non-meritocratic 
presentation of the bureaucrat. The Naukarshahi accusation pointed to the subservience 
demands by this class of public servant, the rule of the public servant or Civil Servant as 
ruler, is indicated by the particular terminology. 
The high-powered Administrative Reforms Committee set up in April 1972 under the 
chairmanship of Khurshid Hasan Mir was of the view that the first step in the direction of 
administrative reform should be the replacement of the colonial structure of the services by a 
modern and scientific system responsive to democratic aspirations. Z.A. Bhutto made the 
recommendation in favour of a unified civil service. In August 1973, the Government 
accepted the Report, initiating colossal changes in Pakistan’s Civil Service. All the services 
and cadres were merged into a unified grading structure with equality of opportunity for all 
who enter the service at any stage based on the required professional and specialised 
competence necessary for each job. All classes among the government servants were 
abolished and similarly replaced by a unified grading structure. The existing classification of 
the services into class-I to class-IV was also done away with and the road to the top was 
21
opened to all on merit. The use of service labels was discontinued.  The civil services 
reforms of 1973 also introduced a new system of common Training programme and all the 
occupational groups were required to undergo a mandatory combined training at the civil 
services academy, Lahore. The batch of officers who attended the civil services academy in 
1973 is now recognised as “the 1st common”. Lateral entry was introduced which was a 
248
21
For further detail See Group Research Paper, Faculty Advisor, Brig. Shahid Akram Kardar ‘Civil Service 
Reforms; Building Public Sector Leadership’ Pakistan Administrative Staff College, Lahore, (82nd National 
Management Course).
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direct threat to the bureaucrats because now political appointees would be a part of their 
22
system.
3. THE BHUTTO REGIME AND THE BEGINNING OF 
BUREAUCRATIC REFORM
The implementation of Bhutto’s reforms significantly altered the cadre system of 
organisation of the bureaucracy with the abolition of the CSP, the lineal descendant of ICS. 
Its members were regrouped into the newly created District Management Group (DMG). 
Additionally, group privileges such as benefits from service associations and the reservation 
of key posts in the secretariat for the CSP was discontinued. With the creation of All Pakistan 
Unified Grade System there was no longer a distinction between CSP, PSP and other groups. 
Lateral entry was introduced, allowing professionals and political appointees to enter the 
system. While the constitutions of 1956 and 1962 retained the right of civil servants to have 
recourse to the courts the 1973 reforms dismantled this mechanism.
The reforms provided greater access for the political process to direct the activities of 
the bureaucrat [Kennedy (1987)] thought this did not always lead to greater institutional 
ability to deliver public service. The shift in power between the political and bureaucratic 
classes permitted politicians to intervene in the actions of the bureaucrats as well as to 
castigate them for past actions that were not regarded as in the political interest. In particular, 
the Abolition of service cadres made it easier for politicians to use arbitrary powers of 
punishment such as removal of the civil servants [Laporte (1981)]. 
The political economy that provided the context for the bureaucratic reforms and the 
radical changes that were wrought in the relationship between the arms of the state and its 
implications for the self-perception of the bureaucrat are dominant themes in the interviews.
After the elections Bhutto took over, that when the politicians started exerting a lot of 
pressure on the civil servants. But still the CSS was by and large intact, it was still a 
cohesive group, and that time Mr Bhutto also remarked at the Dinner at the Civil 
service academy that the CSP are responsible for whatever ill prevails in the system, 
they interfere with the political system, they are not willing to carry out the writ of the 
government, and he said that  I want to finish them, I want to reform and finish this 
CSP cadre, very shortly he appointed this man as the establishment secretary , who 
controlled all the policies regarding the personnel, transfers posting, a very important 
post, he was not a CSP, he started these big reforms, the first step was to do away with 
the service labels. The CS association was banned. The CSP were not allowed to have 
any association, then 1973 reforms came, and the CSP now had to go higher to 
compete. This was the first big change.
 (Bureaucrat 11)
The sense of a political contestation between the bureaucratic and political classes to 
gain the lions’ share of power was sharply etched in the response of the bureaucrats. The loss 
of the legal guarantee whereby the bureaucrat was insulated from the political process was a 
particularly sore dimension of the loss that bureaucrats had to accept in the changed political 
environment after the 1973 reforms.  
22
Despite the administrative reforms there has been little change in the pay and grade structure of the 
Pakistani administration. The reforms focus largely on a reorganisation in relation to the organisational behaviour of 
the bureaucracy, most specifically in relation to reducing its combative power against the ministerial class. Please 
see table for the pay scale of the bureaucracy. 
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The ministers’ are supposed to be making policy not interfering with actual 
implementation, but in actual practice they flout that. They are more interested in 
doing day to day administration, than in making policy. So the bureaucrat has to 
suffer, he has to be willing to take one of methods the government has provided to 
punish the officer to make him an officer on special duty. This means no job, no 
assignment, no perks, so officer is afraid of that, as he loses the chance to have all the 
facilities if he does not obey his political bosses. The bureaucrats had political 
insulation before the constitution of 1973 when Bhutto changed the constitution. But 
not now they don’t have political insulation.
(Bureaucrat 1)
The consequences of these changes were often couched in terms of the objective set 
of laws and standards these bureaucrats had come to regard as their raison d'être. The 
argument is these accounts was strongly developmental, and it was clear that these 
bureaucrats regarded themselves as the agents of the delivery of programmes that would 
bring about social and economic transformation of Pakistan.
My personal perception of bureaucracy is that bureaucracy in a developing country 
has to be free and impartial to perform. If it is free and impartial and is allowed to 
perform then this is the most stabilising factor in a developing country. The 
politicians can play around, the governments can come and go, but if there is a stable 
bureaucracy there is constant development in the country that is what happened till 
1973, when the new constitution came into existence. Mr Bhutto I think dealt the 
most severe blow to the services, by withdrawing constitutional guarantee from the 
civil services.
(Bureaucrat 8)
The manner in which the 1973 reforms detracted from the ability of the bureaucrat to 
ensure effective delivery of duty was set out in relation to (i) the now ‘undue’ interference 
from the political establishment and (ii) the lack of group support and networks that resulted 
from the removal of the service associations.
The constitutional guarantee was a very good safeguard for the civil servants to 
perform and be independent. Once that guarantee was withdrawn the civil servants 
felt very weak, gradually as time passed they became aligned with one particular 
party or the other. This is one thing I could not do. I was the last person who would go 
to a politician or even a general if the army was involved and seek protection. Why , if 
my conduct is above board, if my integrity is not in question, my ability to function, 
ability to perform is not questioned, why should I seek anybody’s protection. My 
own performance, my own integrity is the biggest protection that I have. And then 
1973 constitution came into existence, the guarantee’s were withdrawn, the 
bureaucracy started to become weak and weak….. Once the politicians and the 
government started making a choice of their own without merit of jumping seniority, 
of giving important posts to people who were not trained in that particular 
department or that that service the whole structure became confused.. That is where 
favouritism started….Anybody who has some self respect, who is proud of his own 
integrity cannot survive in this system, it is not possible. ..you  have to listen to his 
(Minister ) whims, his orders. That is the thing that killed the spirit.
 (Bureaucrat 8)
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The associations were already weak, and then banned, so the CSP’s could not resist 
the 1973 reforms. And there had been co-optations of individuals. The military had 
co-opted individuals. The CSP’s became aligned with the military. Bhutto, Ayub and 
Yahya had all thrown out officers most of them were CSP officers. I know one 
gentleman who was honest to the core, Bhutto had some differences with him, and 
Bhutto threw him out. In 1975 they divided the Civil service in two groups the DMG 
and the secretariat service. At that time the idea was that the district management will 
gradually go away, at that time the Cornelius report had recommended that district 
administration should be run by elected representatives.
 (Bureaucrat 11)
Bhutto’s civil service reforms programme 1973 shattered the bureaucratic 
Brahmanism. The shakeup provided by the reforms transformed the bureaucrat from a 
mandarin to a manager thereby creating a fundamental break in the political organisation, 
both in relation to the previous hierarchy in the services as well as by permitting rapid lateral 
entry into the civil service [Khan (2002)]. The civil service began to resemble a fragile house 
of cards that was exposed to new winds driven by the whims of politicians. The removal of 
insulation from political pressure and the sudden fall in their administrative power caused 
23
bureaucrats to adopt a low-profile approach [Khan (2002)]  that resulted in a slowing down 
of bureaucratic process and a growing lethargy in the administrative machinery. The 
administrative reforms had humbled the mighty civil servant and created new dissensions 
among Pakistan’s professional élites [Ziring and Laporte (1974)]. In the Pakistani reforms of 
1973 the disenchantment manifest itself through a growing misuse of bureaucratic authority, 
particularly in relation to growing use of public office for personal gain, i.e., forms of 
24
financial corruption.
4. THE ZIA YEARS AND NEW INSTITUTIONAL ALLIANCES
In 1977, Bhutto’s regime was overthrown by a military coup spearheaded by General 
Zia Ul Haq. The authoritarian rule under a military head of state that followed was unusual in 
its moderate treatment of existing institutions [Burki and Baxter (1991)]. The bureaucrats 
were not required to relinquish their existing posts, nor did the new government institute any 
drastic transfers of bureaucrats. To the contrary, the Zia administration chose to constitute 
the Anwar-ul-Haq Commission to rehabilitate and promote some level of confidence, among 
the Civil Services, particularly the CSP. 
There appears to be a contradictory swing between existence of political democracy 
and possibility of pursuing political neutrality in Pakistan. While the democratic government 
of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto undertook widespread and extreme 1973 administrative reforms, 
particularly the removal the constitutional guarantee, the dictatorial regime under Zia was 
keen to consolidate the functions of the bureaucrat. In a similar comparison, the PPP, under 
Benazir Bhutto’s government (and PML under Nawaz Sharif) regarded political neutrality 
with suspicion as bureaucrats were regarded as being supported of the erstwhile party in 
power and therefore oppositional to the new government. On the other hand, the military 
dictatorship of General Pervez Musharraf was relatively supportive of the bureaucracy. 
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For further depth see Khan, A. A Historical Review of Elitism in the Federal Bureaucracy of Pakistan and 
a Critical Analysis of Pakistan’s Higher Public Administration. National Development and Security 10: 3, Spring 
2002.
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My experience was that by in large the military process was more rational, they at 
least understand the issues, compared to the democratic leaders, the attitude of the 
democratic leaders was, that now we are the boss and we have to decide…In my 
experience the army generally was more rational and abiding by the law.
  (Bureaucrat 1)
This oppositional relationship between democracy and political neutrality is in stark 
contrast to the established proposition that democratic government will direct the 
bureaucracy to follow principles of political neutrality. The explanation may lie in the fact 
that the bureaucracy as a part of the executive arm of the state is regarded more favourably by 
strong authoritarian forces that adopt a statist approach while democratic governments that 
must ensure a political settlement tend to consider the existing bureaucracy in an 
oppositional light.
In a political environment where bureaucrats are regarded as oppositional to a new 
incoming elected government, the principle of political neutrality transforms into a negative 
feature, one that indicates an absence of allegiance to the new government. 
In your mind you can be neutral, but you can’t tell them on their face. Others will be 
more politically inclined than you and you will look bad in comparison. You will not 
then be successful. Your friend will be District Commissioner (DC) Lahore and you 
will be DC of some God forsaken place. And the boss will give the reason 'he does not 
have initiative, he can’t do his job well.
 (Bureaucrat 6)
We bureaucrats suffer; we are always trying to clarify the perceptions, and say “no I 
am not with so and so”. You seem to just go around giving explanations and talking to 
the politicians, that “it seems that you are annoyed with me?
(Bureaucrat 25)
Under the present circumstances it is not possible to be politically neutral....the 
politicians expect the bureaucrat to pitch in one side or the other. There is the concept 
of loyalty, it is not loyalty to the state, it is not even loyalty to some organizations, but 
loyalty to the person. So if one is loyal to Nawaz Sharif or Benazir their chances of 
success are higher when they come into power.
 (Bureaucrat 25) 
Bureaucrats who persist in following the political neutrality principle find that they 
are singled out for punishment for a lack of loyalty to the new administration. The new found 
power that politicians, particularly ministers had over the careers of bureaucrats was 
regarded as a considerable hardship by bureaucrats.
Once I left the service I was hounded for a bit, wherever I would get a job, the prime 
minister would interfere and get me sacked. I guess he really disliked me. He (then 
PM) got me sacked from two organisations, and then I finally got a job because his 
government was toppled.
 (Bureaucrat 12)
The increasing interference of the ministerial class over the bureaucracy emerges as a 
particularly contentious area. Both sides accuse the other of exceeding their brief and 
thereby obstructing the delivery of development programmes.
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5. THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT 
WITHIN THE PAKISTANI STATE
The reason for the decline in political neutrality that is uppermost in the mind of 
bureaucrats in Pakistan is the rise demand for politicians for preferential, and increasingly 
illegal, services. The increasing pressure makes it harder for the bureaucrat to remain 
politically neutral as  there is a rising penalty for the refusal to acquiesce to such political 
demands. The framework of external laws and standards that should be applied in relation to 
the delivery of public service becomes increasingly untenable in the face of growing political 
demands.  The increasing pressure was identified as a key theme by various interviewees.
One reason why I left was when I was posted as director general development 
authority, 1988 elections were on, the first election after Zia ul Haq went, the then 
Chief minister came to me and said I want plots. He said I want plots for my 
candidates, I said for what reason? He said because they need to contest elections, I 
want 200 plots. I said there are no plots available. He said I need them, I said I can’t 
give them too you. He asked why? I said because it is illegal, first you will get 
arrested, then I will get arrested, and I will not give them to you. I gave him only the 
available plots, which was legal. He got very annoyed with me and immediately after 
the elections he transferred me to my old post, and after four months he made me an 
25
OSD  for 18 months.
 (Bureaucrat 11)
Since the 70s, bureaucrats could not afford to be neutral. Before the 1970’s it was 
possible, as they had the constitutional guarantee on their side. But this changed since 
the 1970’s. I myself twice I was told, in so many words, ‘we will not ask you to do 
anything illegal, but you see we have to look after the interests of the party and 
therefore what we tell you needs to be done.’(the then PM) I just listened and I 
thought that I would not last very long at the job. Well in one case I did not last, the 
other case they kept delaying my promotion.
 (Bureaucrat 13)
The greatest sense of disaffection among the bureaucracy was with regard to the 
withdrawal of the constitutional guarantee that prevented the administration from 
intervening in the decisions and actions of the bureaucrats through imposition of penalty, 
punitive transfers and outright dismissal. The constitutional guarantee had provided the 
bureaucrat impunity from the political system and thereby worked towards ensuring the 
separation of powers of the state. The guarantee had therefore come to be regarded as the 
lifeline of the bureaucrat, and its withdrawal left them feeling vulnerable and exposed to 
other parts of the state administration as well as the broader political system.
No, it is not possible to be politically neutral, not in the present setup. If only the 
constitutional guarantee had continued. You know what a constitutional guarantee 
is? That means that the government can’t fire you without giving you a good reason, 
and then the reason and the firing is fully justifiable, and you can go to the court and 
get relief, and the government needs to justify why they did it. Now there is no 
constitutional guarantee, it is not possible.
 (Bureaucrat 8 )
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OSD stands for Officer on Special Duty. It is the worst transfer order given to a bureaucrat. it implies the 
officer has no portfolio, no office, and he relinquishes his post to remain at home till further notice.
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Well there was no problem until the constitutional guarantees were there. There was a 
regularly laid down procedures. So survival was not a thought utmost in mind. 
Survival came when purge of 1972, 1984 took place. And then the various martial law 
regulations etc. when these issues arose then you started looking for protectives. You 
started looking for lobbies, you started looking for linkages. You started looking for 
friends of the ruling party. When Nawaz Sharif came you started looking for survival 
by cultivating his friends. Same goes for PPP and Musharraf’s rule. Survival is really 
based on connections.
 (Bureaucrat 25)
With the changes brought about by administrative reforms, changing power 
configuration across the arms of the state and the associated downsizing of the political clout 
of the bureaucracy there emerged reasons for negating the value of political neutrality within 
the bureaucracy. The implication of the requirement that bureaucrats show political 
allegiance was that any observance of an external set of laws and standards was now an 
obstacle rather than an assurance of promotion and career progression. Additionally, the 
failure of a bureaucrat was often linked to the inability to show adequate political allegiance 
and there was considerable emphasis on the qualities of wiliness and duplicity that the 
bureaucrat needed to develop in order to continue to be effective in delivering development 
while appearing to support the political establishment. 
As you go up you also need to learn the art of political management, you need to be 
politically savvy.
 (Bureaucrat 16) 
Apple polishing and buttering them up is part of our culture. 
(Bureaucrat 21)  
Once you get into higher positions, you have to play some sort of political games.
(Bureaucrat 22)
When the bureaucrats were asked, the questions and answers resulted as follows:
Q. Do you think that it is possible to be successful and politically neutral?
A. 18 out of 21 said that it is absolutely not possible.
Q. Is it possible to have political immunity in the administrative system?
A. All of the bureaucrats felt that it was not possible at all. 
This increasing need to please political masters has resulted in political neutrality 
being sidelined in favour of public display of allegiance through practices that signal loyalty 
to the politicians. In particular, it is the interference by ministers that has been regarded as 
offensive, often being very detrimental to the career of the bureaucrat. The perceptions of 
ministers regarding this turnaround in the power structure in the Pakistani administration 
underlines the importance accorded to loyalty of the bureaucrat to his political superiors, 
particularly so in relation to the minister concerned. 
The ministers don’t want not loyalty they want blind obedience from the 
bureaucracy, towards their own constituency, they are not pushed about the mega 
picture.
(Minister 4)
‘I think the bureaucrats are totally been made impotent, they are not allowed to move 
at all.
 (Minister 3)
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Yes I agree that the ministers did not let them work freely…now the only survival is 
that if the bureaucrat takes the side of some political party…. Not impersonal, no one 
is…Minister is not so much to blame. Because in this scenario, the chief executive of 
the federal or provinces has his go… and his friends or his cronies are the 
ministers…. They are not holding it exactly… for example if you want to   post some 
one DPO or DCO, it is not done, by the secretary finance or by the chief secretary… 
the chief minister is  involved in it… 
(Minister 2)
The implications for the delivery of development programmes of such a system of 
explicit evidence of loyalty among bureaucrats for their ministerial bosses have been rather 
negative. The lack of dovetailing of bureaucratic and ministerial objectives, the delay in 
target setting and the often poorly designed and selected performance targets result in poor 
and insufficient delivery of public service. The ineptitude is not restricted to a particular 
development programme but becomes endemic to the career trajectory of the bureaucrat 
who comes to regard political allegiance as part of the job and therefore moves away from 
external set law and standards of the Weberian ilk to regarding the ministerial demands as the 
criterion against which to measure performance.
That is true, political interference is there most of the time… the politician’s concern 
is not to improve the ministry’s performance, because a minister is not judged for his 
performance in the ministry, and again in our government the prime minister sets up a 
frame work for checking the ministry and we were asked ourselves to set up your own 
targets.  We set those targets…. And there was a cell in the prime minister house 
which used to monitor the advancement of those targets as far as you were concerned 
as a minister… but then if you did not meet those targets there was no penalty… 
because once you start penalising a minister there are political repercussions, which 
the government is not willing to bear… but I think that also has to be done… the 
minister head of the policy,  they do come with a political background and a political 
mind set… but at the same time when they are heading a technical ministry … they 
should be judged in some way…..if a bureaucrat does not listen to the minister then 
he is made an OSD, …there are issues bureaucrats are total sycophants the minister 
should be total incompetent and that’s a very good team if you want to take ministry 
in the wrong direction… but somebody has to change that…
 (Minister 4)
 
In early mid career when you became DC, the whole concept of “Mai Baap” 
(Parent) of the district, to sort out the problems of anybody and everybody who 
comes to him. …the  concepts began to change Mid career, when we went through 
the revolutionary upheaval brought in by the PPP party and with each passing day, 
one became more and more cynical. One wanted to get to key positions, the objective 
had changed, and it was no longer serving the people. I am sorry to say it became 
more selfish. One started looking at post retirement economic benefits, perhaps a 
settled life, social connections, friends, marriage of children, yourself preservation 
became an important issue in the later part of mid career. In your final years of course, 
your job becomes more and more dependent on the political whims of people, you 
began to bend the rules, the idealism went, and you are no longer the sort of person 
you were earlier, so it meant that you did not say no so frequently.
 (Bureaucrat 25)
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The realisation that the singular pursuit of political neutrality would not bring about 
career such was indicated in the interviews where 18 out of 21 answered that it was not 
possible to be successful by remaining politically neutral. There was unanimous consensus 
that there was no political immunity for the Pakistani Bureaucrat. The Retired bureaucrats 
were of the opinion that as they had continued to abide by the principles of political neutrality 
they had been victimised by the politicians. 
The difficulty that bureaucrats have felt in coming to terms with the reduced public 
control that they can exercise in the execution of government policy is still couched in terms 
of the Weberian notion of a meritocratic, rational and objective state actor. This notion has 
been severely tested by the administrative reforms brought about by the various political 
regimes that have ruled Pakistan since independence. In particular, the growing demand for 
public displays of loyalty to the ministerial class, most often in relation to deference to 
ministerial compulsions and machinations has been regarded as unpleasant but inevitable in 
the new political settlement that has emerged in Pakistan in the last few decades. The 
negation of political neutrality is witnessed in the growing presence of corruption, 
administrative slowdown and politicisation of bureaucratic decision making. The 
uncomfortable compromise that the bureaucratic class has had to make with the increasingly 
dominant political classes is that there will be a pandering to the need for political allegiance 
to maintain the political settlement within the state while still working to ensure the delivery 
of development.
6.  CONCLUSION
The article shows that the initial dominance of the bureaucratic elite in Pakistan was a 
consequence of an overdeveloped bureaucracy on account of a colonial inheritance [Alavi 
(1971)].  The bureaucratic overhang that was an outcrop of the colonial administration was 
regarded as elite, brahmanical and mandarin like in its attitudes to society and particularly its 
engagement with politicians and political parties. The imbalance in the Pakistani state that 
has resulted from this highly unequal power sharing between bureaucratic and political 
players made it almost impossible to come to a stable political settlement within the state 
[Khan (1996)]. This position of bureaucratic dominance was undermined by the 
administrative reforms brought in under during Bhutto’s early years in office and this took 
away many bureaucratic privileges, most particularly the safeguard against political 
interference provided by the constitutional guarantee. 
 The consequences for the delivery of development is an increasingly inefficient and 
poorly designed and executed programmes by the bureaucracy as the demands of the 
political process overtake the requirements of the programme. The damage done is not only 
to the development agenda but to the very institutions of the country. By replacing political 
neutrality by political allegiance there has been a shift in the rules by which the bureaucracy 
was playing. In place of the externally set standards of merit and impartiality there is now an 
emphasis on publicly supporting political demands and ensuring that bureaucratic action did 
not directly contradict political sentiment. The Pakistani bureaucracy is entrenched in a 
quagmire of political intrigues and is miles away from the ideal a political officer that Weber 
(1968) envisaged.
After analysing the perceptions of the bureaucracy regarding the political 
complexities they encounter in their professional lives, it appears that it would be a mistake 
to use the Weber’s heuristic notion of bureaucracy to sort out organisational perplexities of 
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Pakistan’s civil service. It is not a bureaucracy in the classical sense. It is far too complex, 
with far too much history, to be relegated to such a simple characterisation [Jones (1997), p. 
364].
Fig. 1. Political Influence in the Civil Service 
From: Haque, N. and Khawaja (2007) Public Service Through the Eyes of Civil Servants. PIDE Series on 
Governance and Institutions. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 2007
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Pau Scale
Minimum
(Rs)
Increment
(Rs)
Number of Pay
Points
Maximum
(Rs)
Sample Position
Sweeper
Quasid
Daftri
Dispatch Rider, Driver
Urdu Typist
Telex Operator
Stenotypist
Accountant
Stenographer
Admin Officer
Private Secretary
Agronomist
Deputy Secretary, Senior Agricultural
Economist
Economic Consultant, Joint Secretary
Senior Joint Secretary
Secretary
APPENDIX
Table 1
Basic Monthly Pay Scale
Source: World Bank (1998) Pakistan a Framework for Civil Service Reform in Pakistan. Report No. 18386-PAK. p. 68.
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